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 
Abstract—We propose building a new PKC in a ring structure, 
the classification of rings being an open problem. The difficulty of 
the scheme is based on retrieving the eigenvalues of endomorphism 
on a finite type module over a non-commutative ring. It is resistant 
to a chosen cipher text attack. Working in the fraction ring of a 
non-commutative ring makes our scheme a zero-knowledge proof 
of knowledge, result indistinguishable, in the Naor-Yung model. 
Finally, a dramatic improvement in security is obtained through 
the drawing with uniform probability of the working ring at high 
frequency. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
URING the Catacrypt’2014 session some important issues 
were discussed. Among them a clear call for new PKC 
primitives was made. The fact is that the PKC’s at our disposal 
today mainly are the Diffie-Hellmann scheme for key 
distribution which, in some way, has been extended into 
schemes based on elliptic curves and the RSA. It is a fact that 
all these algorithms are based on group theory for which we 
basically know two things: 
1- The classification of finite groups is a problem which 
has been definitely solved by mathematicians 
2- Many papers of group theory have not been published 
by governmental organizations so that the crypto 
community might not be aware about some possible 
attacks on cryptosystems working in groups (1). 
This therefore pleads for proposing new PKC’s dealing with 
other structures than groups. There are several candidates, but 
we decided to deal with rings as will be explained later on. In 
this paper we shall describe the algorithm (a PKC), we shall 
show its advantages and drawbacks and shall justify our 
choices. In the particular case of the fraction ring of 
noncommutative rings, we shall show that we can transform the 
algorithm into a one round zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. 
Finally, we shall explain how such a point of view can be used 
to propose a new way of making cryptosystems and in particular 
we shall insist on the fact that our very algorithm cannot be 
attacked by a chosen ciphertext attack. We shall also explain 
why quantum computers, whatever their computation power, 
cannot break it. 
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II. DEALING WITH RINGS 
The first reason why we propose dealing with rings as a will to 
escape PKC’s running in groups is because the problem of the 
classification of rings still is an open problem (2). Therefore, the 
risk of a broken general PKC running in rings is expected to be 
much lower than for a one running in a group. The only 
drawback is that in a ring we potentially have a richer structure 
than in a group and therefore we could expect, in the meanwhile, 
to be able to perform more computations in a ring than in a 
group and have something weaker in the end. But this is not 
what will happen as we shall see in the following. 
The second reason why we choose rings is that we aim at 
choosing it noncommutative because in such a structure even a 
linear one variable equation displays no efficient algorithm to 
be solved. Typically, what could be any “intelligent” algorithm 
to solve the general following equation in a “random” 
noncommutative ring? 
 
ax xb c    (0.1) 
There also is an even simpler equation which is not evident to 
solve either and which is the following.  
  
axb c   (0.2) 
If a  and/or b   is/are not invertible. In general, there seems to 
be no escape to trial and error. Now, it can obviously happen 
that in a particular ring such an instance of the problem is easy 
to solve. We shall discuss this point later on. 
If we want to design a cryptosystem, we must find a way to hide 
information in a public key. The way we propose to solve this 
problem is the following. Let us consider a noncommutative 
finite left ring R . Let us consider a finite type module on R  
which we call M . Let us begin with the assumption that 
dim 2R M   and let us consider the set of linear applications 
on M  which we call  L M . Let us choose at random two 
non-zero different elements in R  which we call 2  and 3 . 
Let us then draw at random (i.e. with uniform probability), two 
non-zero vectors ,x y M  so that they make a basis of M . 
Let us write these vectors in column into a 2 2  matrix which 
we call 
1P  and let us compute  
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Clearly, 0F  is a diagonalizable endomorphism of M . 
Nevertheless, to compute, given 0F , its eigenvalues, at least 
means solving a system of 2 equations with 2 unknowns. As 
asserted above, we are not even able to solve a sole equation 
with one unknown in general in a noncommutative ring. 
Therefore, we can expect this as being a difficult problem. To 
be more precise, if 0
a b
F
c d
 
  
 
 we need to solve the 
following system of equations.  
 
xa yb x
xc yd y


 

 
  (0.4) 
Where ,x y  and   are unknown. 
 
The fact is that if we consider the same problem in a 
commutative ring, a way to solve it, is to compute the roots of 
the minimal polynomial. But, if, for example, the ring is Z/nZ, 
then solving the problem is equivalent to factoring. This remark 
therefore implies that in the general case, we face a (much) 
harder problem than the one of factoring. 
But, at this very point, we only have a clue of the difficult 
problem we want to deal with in order to get security. We still 
are lacking an enciphering algorithm. 
 
III. THE BASIC IDEA 
Since finding the eigenvalues of an endomorphism is a difficult 
problem, then finding the eigenvectors also is a difficult 
problem and we can think about scrambling the message with 
random vectors. For that, we need the message to be a vector. 
So, let us consider M  now as a module over R  of dimension 
3. Let us call the message to send  0Mx M  . Let us build, 
as before, a matrix which will be our public key  
  
1
0
0 0
0
0
F a b
c d
 
 
  
 
 
  (0.5) 
 
 
1 In most cases depending on how far the application from R into itself and 
which associates to x  the value x  is from a bijection. 
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 and where 
 1 0RR    is chosen at random and different from 2  and 
3 . 
Let us then choose at random, as before, two non-zero vectors 
,y z M  so that  , ,x y z  is a basis of .M  Let us build a 
3 3  matrix 1K  which is made of the vectors , ,x y z  in 
column and which is therefore invertible and let us compute  
  
1
0F K F K
   (0.6) 
Now, just please notice that 1  is known, so that we know at 
least this eigenvalue of F  and therefore the clear message is 
collinear to any eigenvector associated to 1 . However, such 
knowledge is not enough to decipher anything1. We must 
therefore add some information. The first idea we had was 
simply to transfer, together with F , an additional vector which 
would have been x y z  . But it is straightforward to show 
that this gives far too much information to an attacker and 
allows in the end to find the eigenvalues of F . A corrective 
idea is to play with the ring structure as shown above and 
multiply vector x  by some “not so random” numbers in the ring 
R . This is what we are going to propose but, before, let us 
tackle some discussion. 
Indeed, at Catacrypt’2014, it was said that we are pretty 
confident in the hash functions designed by the crypto 
community. We therefore should target, when possible, to 
include hash functions in PKC’s. In the context where we are, 
such a fact is paramount in the sense that it is going to reinforce 
the hard problem we are dealing with and linked with the ring 
structures by adding operations which are not part of the ring 
structure itself. Typically, on purely theoretical grounds, since 
the classification of rings is an open problem, then the 
classification of rings which are “augmented” with hash 
functions has not commenced! So, let us consider 2 different 
one-way hash functions, say 1h  and 2h  both starting in M  and 
providing an image in R . Now, we propose the cipher text 
being  
  
    1 2, . .F h y x h z y z    (0.7) 
Where the dots mean the external multiplication in M . 
Deciphering works as follows. Upon reception of the cipher text 
from Bob, Alice decomposes    1 2. .h y x h z y z  on the 
Eigen basis of F  which she knows because she knows the 
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eigenvalues. This gives her trivially y  and z , hence  1h y  
and  2h z . It remains to invert these 2 numbers and get x  
trivially. 
For such an algorithm to work “well”, we need the ring has 
“many” invertible elements so that the probability to get 
invertible elements for  1h y  and  2h z  is high otherwise we 
would be unable to decipher. 
 
IV. SECURITY 
We shall only give heuristic proofs, but the reader should be 
aware that the general scheme presented here resists a chosen 
cipher text attack in the Naor Young model (3). Roughly 
speaking, let us assume an attacker would feed Alice with 
chosen cipher text in the form  ,g v  where g  is a 3 3  
matrix and v  is a vector of M . There are 2 cases. Either g  is 
not similar to 0F  (that means there does not exist any matrix 
K  such that 1
0g K F K
 ). In such a case, Alice does not 
provide any deciphering of the message. Just please notice that 
the checking can easily be made in polynomial time. Now, if g  
is similar to 0F , Alice is going to give the decipherment of v . 
To some extent, this means that    1 2v h y xh z y z   , 
and, given our assumptions, the best which can occur for the 
attacker is to get a new matrix 'g  similar to g  under the form  
  
1 0 0
' 0
0
g a b
c d
 
 
  
 
 
  (0.8) 
And the attacker is also given x . Please notice that we were 
very kind with the attacker since in reality, he should not get the 
first line with two zeros in it2. The form of 'g  allows knowing 
y z . Therefore the attacker has the equation 
       
1 1
1 2x h y v y z h z
 
    and by the fact that y  
and z  are eigenvectors, x  cannot be recovered. Moreover, 
even if the attacker was able to know  1h y  and  2h z , then 
because of the security of the hash functions, this would not give 
any information about y and z . 
Therefore, in some way, we have at least in this scheme, 3 
barriers of security. 
 
 
 
2 Indeed, giving one vector of the Eigen plane at least gives one bit of 
information on one of the eigenvectors and we know that in the case of 
V. REFINEMENT 
We shall not elaborate much further in this paragraph, but just 
let us remark that for the sake of simplicity the reader might be 
aware that we dealt with “traditional” eigenvalues which are in 
the center of the ring. A refinement would consist in dealing 
with eigenvalues on the left, say, which are no more the same 
and which are much harder to find. This complicates things in a 
non-negligible way. 
 
VI. THE CHOICE OF THE RING 
A. General choice 
The typical non commutative ring is a ring of matrices (but not 
only…!). We can easily imagine rings of matrices of matrices 
and so on. The chance we have with such rings is that the subset 
of non-invertible elements, that is, of non-invertible matrices is 
small so that in general most elements chosen at random will be 
invertible and we shall have no problem in performing the 
computations above. Apart this constraint of having most 
elements which should be invertible, we have no other one, 
which allows choosing among almost all the possible existing 
rings and therefore out of classification rings. 
 
B. Increasing the computation speed 
First of all, at least if we deal with matrices making a specific 
hardware is very efficient in parallelizing the operations and 
therefore we can have a very efficient scheme. 
Now, if we want to increase the computation speed on a pure 
software point of view, we need to accelerate the computation 
of the inverses in the ring. For such a purpose, the best is to 
consider a fraction ring. The problem is that fraction rings of 
noncommutative rings do not necessarily exist. For the fraction 
ring to exist, the ring must possess what is called the left or right 
Ore condition. The right Ore condition (4) for example says that  
  
, , ', ' / ' 'a b R a b R aa bb       (0.9) 
Whenever a  and b  are not divisors of zero. Let us then 
consider 
 
  , , , ,  is not a divisor of zeroS a b a R b R b     (0.10) 
We can define an equivalence relation on S  by writing  
(𝑎, 𝑏)~(𝑐, 𝑑) ↔ 𝑎𝑏′ = 𝑐𝑑′ 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑏𝑏′ = 𝑑𝑑′𝑣𝑖𝑎 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛   (0.11) 
Then the quotient set  𝐴 = 𝑆/~ where the operations are defined 
in the natural way, is the fraction ring of R . 
 
 
computation taking place in Z/nZ this would be equivalent to be able to 
factoring in polynomial time [3]. 
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When such a fraction ring exists, it is evident that the inversion 
is instantaneous since it consists in a swap. The computations 
therefore become very efficient. Nevertheless, we face a big 
problem. 
 
C. The problem and its solution 
Bob enciphers x  and gets     1 2, . .F h y x h z y z  . 
Alice deciphering gives x . But there is a trick! Indeed, in that 
case x  is an equivalence class because of the construction of 
the ring of fractions. Mathematically, we have deciphered, but 
on a computer point of view, we only have a representative of 
the equivalence class of x  and there is no reason for this 
representative to be the same as the original chosen by Bob! 
Given the complexity of the computations, there even is a 
probability of 1 that the obtained representative of the 
equivalence class that Alice gets is chosen with uniform 
probability among the elements of this class. In the end, what do 
we get? 
Bob sends a message and Alice gives him back a 
decipherment. Typically, Bob sends the encryption of x , he 
gets back 'x  in the same class as x . He then computes in M  
' 0Mx x  , this latter class having only one element. This 
typically is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge which is 
result indistinguishable in the sense of Fiat Shamir (5). 
 
D. Open problems 
Whereas we are very pleased with the properties displayed in 
§C, we still would like a scheme allowing us deciphering the 
messages since we want to build a PKC. One idea would be to 
fix some least significant bits, say, of the coordinates of vector 
x . The question is: how many such significant bits are 
necessary to find the good representative in the equivalence 
class on the one hand and if those bits were to be revealed to an 
attacker, how much does it weaken the security of the scheme? 
We do not know the answer to such questions. 
Let us see an alternative. Indeed, let us assume we have 
1
2
3
x
x x
x
  
and let us assume that 
i
i
i
a
x
b
  where ib  has a legal inverse. 
Now, if Bob sends the 'ib s  in clear, since all denominators can 
be any suitable number consistent with the right Ore condition, 
it seems we do not give any information at all (To Be 
Confirmed). However, this dramatically lowers down the rate of 
the scheme since in that case the denominators cannot be part of 
the enciphered message. 
VII. COMPLETING THE SCHEME 
Until now, the reader could be not really convinced of what we 
said because the computations we propose are done in a very 
specific ring. So let us make a step further by assuming that we 
are going to choose a ring at random. We shall not describe how 
to draw such a ring because it is greatly out of the scope of this 
paper. Nevertheless, this can be done! We therefore have a real 
improvement of the global security of such a scheme compared 
with, say, the RSA, since the problem to solve for an attacker 
may be very different depending on which ring is used by the 
user he is targeting. 
But we can even do better. Indeed, the difficulty of breaking 
the scheme being attached to a very ring, the best to be protected 
is to change ring as often as possible. But pseudo-random walks 
in the class of non-commutative rings are quite easy to program 
and therefore it suffices to draw a ring at random very often and 
of course publish a new public key. In our opinion, this greatly 
prevents from a global attack. In particular, the reader will 
notice that a chosen ciphertext attack becomes very difficult if 
not impossible. We can couple this with time slots during which 
there is a validity of both the ring and the public key like today 
in fact, but with a frequency of change which can be pretty high. 
In the end, if we look at a great amount of time with high 
frequency change in the used ring, not only is a chosen 
ciphertext attack no more possible, but the only possible 
algorithm for breaking the global scheme over this time, in 
today’s knowledge when the classification of rings is not 
accomplished, is only trial and error. This implies resistance to 
any quantum computer whatever its power. In fact, even with 
infinite power the right deciphering would appear after a while. 
However, some contextual analysis would be needed to sort out 
the right piece of clear text which would be obtained and if we 
add a scrambler to the initial scheme, then this will prevent such 
an analysis to be done. 
VIII. GENERALIZATION 
Under the condition that it could be possible, we could imagine 
other structures as rings, with say, a set, we shall call A , some 
operations on it, we shall call , ,...  , some hash functions 
such that the global structure  , , ,...,A hash   has enough 
computing properties for efficient algorithms being built, has 
poor enough properties for hard problems to easily occur, and 
the global structure classification has no known solution. Such 
structures could be good candidates for building PKC’s on them 
and could be used with a high frequency change of the 
underlying set itself (together with the very operations of 
course). 
Reminding the beginning of cryptography and the context it 
was described in the famous paper “New directions in 
cryptography”, that is the one of a war, using such strategy to 
rebuild a system out of a “catacrypt”, could be a way to 
elegantly and efficiently solve the problem. 
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